

PART IV. ACTIVE SHOOTER AND MEDICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Chapter 18. ACTIVE SHOOTER EMERGENCY

18.1 Introduction

The definition of an active shooter is: An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.

The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, the Fire and Life Safety (FLS) Director should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD or other law enforcement agency present at the scene.

However, active shooter situations by their very nature are unpredictable and the situations evolve quickly. Although the NYPD will immediately respond to this incident upon notification, it may still take 3 to 5 minutes or longer for the police officers to arrive at the scene.

According to a Study of Active Shooter Incidents (2000 – 2013) report prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice, in 64 incidents where the duration of the incident could be ascertained, 23 (35.9%) incidents ended in 2 minutes or less and 21 (32.8%) incidents ended in 2 to 5 minutes. This means even when the NYPD was present or able to respond within minutes, civilians (including FLS staff members and tenants) often had to make life and death decisions of their own accord.

18.2 Preparation and training for an active shooter situation

Emergencies involving an active shooter(s) are fluid and unpredictable. The FDNY developed these recommendations based on other reliable law enforcement sources. Unlike other guides on active shooter attacks, this guide provides recommendations tailored to FLS Directors. Based on the Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation booklet developed by the NYPD, the FDNY recommends that FLS Directors and/or building security personnel (e.g. security manager) prepare his/her building and/or building occupants for the following:

18.2.1 Building preparedness

- Assess what mass notification channels the building has.

For example, some hotels may have installed emergency alert system that the emergency notification can be broadcasted on every television in guest rooms.

- Designate an alternative location if the Fire Command Center becomes compromised. The designated alternative location must be identified in the FDNY plan.
- Assess the function of the building elevator system.
- Keep a copy of the Fire Safety and Evacuation Plan, Building Information Card and floor plans at the Fire Command Center.
- Provide at least 4 “First Responder Kits” containing building floor plans, Building Information Card, fully charged premises security radios/walkie-talkies (if available), access cards and keys for first responders use. The FDNY recommends that the “First Responder Kit” should be placed in the Fire Command Center. It should also be easy to carry away by the FLS Director. Because the FLS Director might not be able to remain at the Fire Command Center to carry out his/her responsibilities while an active shooter emergency occurs. The arriving first responders will need the First Responder Kit to access the building.
- Incorporate active shooter training in non-fire emergency drills.
- Develop the plan with different parties including security, facility engineers, human resources department, emergency management, risk management, etc. The FDNY recommends to develop the plan and to effectively train all occupants to prevent, prepare, and respond to an active shooter incident.
- Recommend the building security personnel (e.g. security manager) to
 - conduct a realistic security assessment to determine the facility’s vulnerability to an active shooter attack.
 - vary security guards’ patrols and patterns of operation so that criminals never know exactly when security will be present.
- Recommend the employer or building manager to establish a procedure for reporting workplace violence.

Under the General Duty Clause, Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, employers are required to provide their employees with a place of employment that "is free from recognizable hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious harm to employees." The FDNY recommends that employers should allow employees who have safety concerns to submit the report. Early reporting of perceived

workplace violence allows management to quickly address and correct a problem before it becomes more severe.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that in many cases active shooter attacks resulted from disagreements among former or current employees of the organization. The FDNY recommends that the FLS Director and the security manager should be notified in advance of terminations and other situations that may lead to aggressive behavior. Awareness and cooperation of public safety, management, supervisors and all other employees is critical to reduce the threat of violence.

- Recommend the employer or building owner to provide or designate barricade locations within tenant spaces that provides an area with ballistic cover, not just visual concealment. The ideal locations should have thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms (a silent signal to a central annunciator panel to notify the emergency situation). If your employer or building owner cannot provide such space, as an FLS Director, you should discuss with the building occupants how to evacuate or barricade safely during an active shooter incident.

The majority of buildings in NYC are not occupied by a single tenant, and therefore each tenant may have their own active shooter plan. As an FLS Director, the FDNY requires you to share the building emergency plan with all the tenants and, through training and drills, encourage them to be familiar with the building policy. The FDNY also recommends you to understand each tenant's plan.

The FDNY recommends the FLS Director in conjunction with the building owner to develop a protocol to identify any building staff or tenant on the premises who has a firearm carry license. The FDNY also recommends that the building should provide these individuals vests, armbands, hats or other form of identification. The FLS Director should also describe the identification type in the First Responders Kit.

These individuals with firearm carry license should be trained that they must identify themselves to building occupants and the first responders by donning the form of identification. They should also be instructed to comply with officer instruction when law enforcement arrive on scene. For example, civilians who possess legal permit to carry a firearm must know that they have to follow the direction of on duty officers. Retired law enforcement and plain clothes officers must always follow the direction of on duty in uniform officers in a challenge situation.

18.2.2 Training

- Building occupants should be trained that the Manual Fire Alarm System should **NOT** be activated for an active shooter emergency. The manual pull stations should only be activated during fire or smoke conditions.
 - * Real case: March 24, 1998: Two shooters opened fire outside their middle school, killing five people and wounding 10 others. Prior to the attack, the shooters pulled the fire alarm, luring the students and teachers outside the building and into the shooters' line of fire.
 - * **Pulling the fire alarm facilitates evacuation but does not facilitate the “proper” Avoid-Barricade-Confront tactics.** Although escaping is generally a good strategy during an active shooter incident, the way people leave actually plays a more important role. People act very differently when they believe there is fire versus when they realize there is a shooter. People will walk directly toward the nearest exit if the fire alarm is sound. However, people will look around cautiously and try to stay away from the shooter during the evacuation if they are clearly notified that there is a shooter in their vicinity.



- * In addition, **pulling a fire alarm also causes confusion to the building staff (FLS Director, building engineers, securities, etc.) and the first responders.** They will need more time to investigate if there is a fire/smoke condition. It will take a longer time to gather critical information regarding the shooting. Pulling the fire alarm may get the Fire Department to respond first; however, the NYPD will be the primary first responders who will control the shooting scene. Firefighters or emergency medical personnel will provide assistance as NYPD allows.
- If a fire alarm is activated, if safe to do so, the FLS Director should follow standard protocol and procedures of a fire emergency but proceed with extreme caution and keep the NYPD survival techniques (Avoid-Barricade-Confront) in mind.

- The most important concept to share with the building occupants is the survival techniques to use. The survival techniques can be fluid based on the threat and may not have to be followed **in any specific order**. Individual decisions should be made based on the active shooter's location(s).

1. Avoid (run/evacuate)



If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises.

Be sure to discuss with the occupants the following:

- Have an escape plan and route in mind.
- Visualize the entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
- Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow.
- Leave your belongings behind, **DO NOT CARRY ANY PACKAGES OR ITEMS THAT COULD BE CONFUSED AS A WEAPON OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.**
- Help others escape, if possible.
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be.
- State whether the doors in the stairways of the building are locked to prevent re-entry into the building, and, if so, on what floors re-entry is allowed (for most buildings, at least every fourth floor). The FLS Director should inform the building occupants that the locked doors may still be locked during an active shooter incident. Once the building occupants enter the stairway, they may need to walk down to the street level and may not be able to re-enter to any floor they want.

- Call 911 when it is safe to do so. Provide the pertinent information (discussed in detail below).

2. Barricade (hide)




If it is not possible to evacuate, find a place to barricade yourself where the active shooter is least likely to find you.

(1) Where to barricade:

- Ideal barricade place should be out of the active shooter's view, but not just visual concealment. Soft wall cubicles and desks may conceal but provide no substantial ballistic protection.
- Ideal barricade place should be an area with both visual concealment and ballistic cover that can provide protection if shots are fired in your direction. Cover should be something of substantial thickness and weight that will stop a bullet. Office furniture and equipment such as vending machines, copy machines, and file cabinets can stop many types of bullets.
- An ideal barricade place should not trap or restrict your options for movement.

(2)What to do when barricading:

- Lock the door, if applicable.
- Blockade the entrance with heavy furniture, if applicable. DO NOT use your body to barricade.
- Silence, not vibrate, your cell phone, pager and/or any other electronic devices.
- Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions).
- Hide behind large items (i.e., file cabinets, copy machines, vending machines).
- Remain quiet.
- Stay low (see the example below).



3. Confront (fight/take action)



If it is not possible to avoid and/or barricade, as a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter:

- Collaborate and act as a group, if possible.
 - Act aggressively.
 - Throw items and improvise weapons.
 - Yell.
 - Commit to your actions.
- Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so and provide the following information to 911 operator, if known:
 - Building address, location of the active shooter or his/her last known location.
 - Number of shooters, if more than one.
 - Physical description of shooter(s).
 - Name/identity of the shooter(s) (e.g. employee).
 - Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).
 - Number of potential victims at the location.
 - If explosions were heard.

*Note: If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen.

- In addition, the building occupants must be trained or informed that after calling 911, they have to also notify FLS Director or other designated FLS staff of the emergency on the premises. The emergency contact information (including 911 number and designated FLS staff phone number, etc.) should be provided to every building occupant.
- Train building occupants how to properly interact with police officers:
 - Follow all official instructions.
 - Do not attempt to run towards or grab onto police officers.
 - Resist the urge to turn quickly or make any sudden movements.

- DO NOT CARRY ANY PACKAGES OR ITEMS THAT COULD BE CONFUSED AS A WEAPON OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling.
- Keep your hands out, open, and above your head, fingers spread apart, and most importantly, EMPTY.



- Do not interfere with responding officers: Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating. Just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises.
- Remember that the first police officers to arrive to the scene may not stop to help injured persons. Expect teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial responding officers. These teams will treat and remove any injured persons from the areas that have been cleared by the first responding police officers. They may also call upon able-bodied occupants to assist in removing the wounded from the premises.
- Remain calm.
- Be prepared to assist and follow instructions of police officers.

Summary for the Required Training

Focus on teaching building occupants basic concepts and basic actions, and make sure they perform them well. In summary, after training, the building occupants should know the following:

1. Survival techniques

Discuss the 3 survival techniques (Avoid-Barricade-Confront) when an active shooter is in their vicinity. Describe in detail how to carry out the techniques.

2. Information for 911 operators

Discuss what information should be provided to the 911 operators.

3. How to respond when police officers arrive on the scene

Inform the occupants what to expect when police officers arrive on scene.

18.2.3 Recommended resources

NYPD Shield provides a pamphlet on active shooter emergencies. The FDNY highly recommends the FLS Director to distribute the pamphlet to all the building occupants (refer to the reference material section of this booklet).

The following on-line training videos can also be used as part of the training material for the building occupants:

FBI.gov : <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>

US Department of Homeland Security: <https://emilms.fema.gov/is907/index.htm>

There are many training courses offered by law enforcement agencies (NYPD, DHS, FBI, etc.) that provide guidance so that managers and employees can prepare to respond to an active shooter situation. **For example, NYPD SHIELD addresses private sector businesses on both an industry-specific and a geographic basis.** This enables the NYPD to best serve the unique needs of each constituency. The FDNY highly recommends for every building to contact NYPD SHIELD at: 718-615-7506 or www.nypdshield.org to apply for membership and to schedule active shooter training.

In addition, active shooter training courses are provided by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) via the following link: <http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>

The manual, “Active Shooter: How to Respond”, published by the US Department of Homeland Security recommends how human resources departments and facility managers should engage in planning for responses if an active shooter event occurs.

18.2.4 Preparing responses during active shooter incidents in different occupancies

Compared to office high-rise building occupancies, hotels and public assembly occupancies (e.g. shopping malls, theaters, etc.) present different challenges during active shooter incidents:

1. **Occupants' familiarity with the building structure:** Most occupants in office buildings are employees who are familiar with their building emergency procedures based on the Fire Code requirements. However, hotels and public assembly areas have very transient populations, which results in less (if any) occupant familiarity with the building's safety features, exit routes, stairways, etc.
2. **Occupants' familiarity with the building staff:** In commercial office buildings, tenants are familiar with the security personnel and fire safety staff because they interact with them frequently. Occupants in hotels and public assembly areas have little, if any, pre-existing relationships with the facility staff, which make it difficult to find help.
3. **Language challenges:** In office buildings, the pre-incident relationships tend to foster an understanding of the building's various tenants and their languages. Language challenges are more likely to occur in hotels and public assembly areas.
4. **Different daily occupancy rates:** Most office buildings have "office hours," where the building's population is significantly greater than at other times (nights and weekends). However, hotels and public assembly areas may have peak occupancy during the nights and on weekends, increasing the risk with lower staffing levels during nights, weekends, or holidays.

FDNY recommends that guests of hotels and theaters should be informed of at least two exits or the exit sign(s) of their floor. The visitors should know where to exit during any type of emergency. Knowledge of evacuation routes will help the visitors to run out of the facility or away from the area under attack.

18.3 **Active shooter emergency responses**

Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the FDNY cannot put forth a set of required actions during such incidents. However, the FDNY has compiled a list of best practice recommendations based on materials developed by the New York City Police Department, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Justice for FLS staff to best prepare if active shooter attack occurs. The following recommendations are **general guidelines**. They are considered as best practice and may be

useful in a real life emergency. It is NOT the purpose of this training material to provide unbending, absolute rules for situations in which there are a great many variables. The most appropriate emergency actions may vary depending on the specific active shooter situation which occurs within the context of the event, the building design and components.

The FDNY has created three categories of response actions for all non-fire emergencies: they are “RECOMMENDED”, “ACCEPTABLE” and “UNACCEPTABLE”.

- The recommended actions- the actions that the FDNY strongly recommends the applicants should apply for the specific scenarios.
- The acceptable actions - the actions that the FDNY accepts but not recommends.
- The unacceptable actions - the actions that the FDNY does not encourage the applicants to apply for the specific scenarios.

The study material is NOT a mandate regarding EAP actions; it is only providing a rule of thumb for general emergency situations. The most appropriate EAP actions may vary depending on the specific emergency situation which occurs within the context of the building design and components.

18.3.1 If an active shooter is outside the building

a. Recommended actions

(1) Recommended actions for the affected area: in-building relocation.

(2) Recommended actions for the rest of the building: in-building relocation.

➤ *Reason:*

Active shooter emergencies are very unpredictable and the situations evolve quickly. Because bullets may travel for miles, the FDNY recommends relocating ALL the occupants to safe in-building relocation areas.

b. Acceptable actions:

(1) Acceptable actions for the affected area: NA.

(2) Acceptable actions for the rest of the building: shelter in place.

➤ *Reason:*

It is safer to relocate the tenants of the rest of the building to safe in-building relocation areas; however, the FDNY accepts (but does not recommend) that the FLS Director suggests occupants in the rest of the building to remain in place.

c. Unacceptable actions:

(1) Unacceptable actions for the affected area: shelter in place, partial or full evacuation (evacuation P/F).

➤ *Reason:*

The occupants who are in the affected area should be moved to a safer location. The decision made to shelter in place may expose the occupants to the threat.

Evacuating the occupants and exposing them to the outside threat will be considered an unacceptable action by the FDNY for this scenario. The FLS Director should direct the occupants to stay away from the threat; it may be safer for the occupants to remain inside the building.

(2) Unacceptable actions for the rest of the building: partial or full evacuation (evacuation P/F).

➤ *Reason:*

Evacuating the occupants and exposing them to the outside threat will be considered an unacceptable action by the FDNY for this scenario. The FLS Director should direct the occupants to stay away from the threat; it may be safer for the occupants to remain inside the building.

II. Other special notes:

All building entrances (including loading docks, garage doors, etc.) should be secured to prevent the shooter(s) from entering the building.

18.3.2 If an active shooter is inside the building

a. Recommended actions

(1) Recommended actions for the WHOLE building:

If an active shooter event occurs inside your building, as an FLS Director, you may be a victim at the scene. You should react quickly when gunshots are heard and/or when a shooting is witnessed by following one of the three tactics: **Avoid, Barricade, Confront** (refer to the training section of this booklet). As a civilian, you are not expected to neutralize an active shooter threat. The FDNY does not recommend that you leave the post to personally respond to incident on affected floors. However, you should try to implement the actions that could minimize the injuries to the building occupants.

For example, if an active shooter starts shooting in close proximity of the Fire Command Center, you should protect yourself based on the tactics suggested by the NYPD. You may run away from the lobby, or you may hide in a safe barricaded location at that moment. Grab the “First Responder Kits” if possible. All of these are a personal choice to be decided on by you at that moment.

Call 911 as soon as possible, safety permitting. Once you feel it is safe to return to the Fire Command Center or designated alternative location, if safe to do so, return to carry out your suggested responsibilities.

The following actions are recommended by the FDNY upon active shooter events, **IF YOU FEEL IT IS SAFE TO DO SO**:

Immediately call 911. The call(s) should report: (1) the emergency situation and (2) FLS action implemented. The following information, if known, should also be provided to the 911 operator:

- a. Building address, location of the active shooter or his/her last known location.
- b. Number of shooters, if more than one.
- c. Physical description of shooter(s).
- d. Name/identity of the shooter(s) (e.g. employee).
- e. Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).
- f. Number of potential victims at the location.
- g. If explosions were heard.

*Note: If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen.

As an FLS Director, if safe to do so, immediately report to the Fire Command Center. The Fire Command Center should be used for command, communication and control of the emergency. If the Fire Command Center is compromised, try to reach the designated alternative location that could allow you to carry out the following responsibilities:

- **Notify the occupants**

The building occupants need to know that there is an active shooter in the building. Depending on the building communication systems, the alert should be delivered via as many different methods as possible (e.g. public announcement system, mass notification system, text, email, etc.).

The notification should be a conveyance of information, not an issuance of a command. The alert must indicate that **there is an active shooter** event taking place inside the building and, if possible, tell the occupants **where the shooter was last seen**. Many companies and associations strongly advocate the position that announcements over the PA system are beneficial and will immediately notify all occupants to implement recognized strategies. **Immediate notification is critical.** Delaying the notification may leave all occupants vulnerable, confused and in panic. A clear notification can help people quickly avoid a dangerous event. Many people think the notification may cause panic in the event of life threatening emergency. However, research has

shown that **clear information about the incident and what actions to take will decrease the risk of panic by making people respond quickly and hence not exposing them to danger.**

Although FDNY does not define “immediately”, the intent of a notification during active shooter incidents is to enable people to protect themselves. This means that a warning should be issued as soon as pertinent information is available.

The Higher Education Act (HEA) also required all postsecondary educational institutions participating in HEA’s Title IV program immediately to notify the campus community upon confirmation of a dangerous situation occurring on the campus that involves an immediate threat to the campus occupants. The US Department of Education encourages higher educational institutions to consider overlapping means of communication in case one method fails or malfunctions. Make a complete list of whatever methods will be used (or will potentially be used depending on the situation): a public address system, text messaging, e-mail messaging, emergency phone lines, etc. If any of the emergency notification services require the campus community to sign up, include specific information on how to do this. Institutions must ensure that notifications and warnings can be transmitted quickly to all students and employees. Therefore, an institution would not be able to rely solely on a text messaging system if all members of the campus community are not required to participate in that system. Similarly relying on an e-mail would not be adequate for institutions that do not establish an e-mail account for all students and employees, or require each member of the campus community to register an e-mail address with the institution.

The Fire Code prohibits the use of pre-recorded voice message. But the FDNY recommends that FLS Directors to prepare or practice the message template in case an active shooter emergency occurs. FLS Directors also need to think in advance what notification system can best be used to notify building occupants. FLS Directors should prepare themselves, train FLS staff and run the practice. FLS Directors should find what kind of notification system can be deployed quickly and will most effectively reach all occupants. **Shorten and simplify the alerts, keep it brief and concise.** The message should be ready for the FLS Directors or FLS staff to deploy at a moment’s notice. FLS Directors can discuss with legal and insurance carriers to review the wording and discuss the pros and cons of the message’s impact.

FLS Directors and other FLS staff also need to practice the announcement; **the announcement should be made in a clear, calm voice. A strong and confident voice can help the occupants to follow direction. Repeat the announcement as many as necessary.**

All announcements must be made in English. However, the FDNY recommends that the announcements may be repeated in foreign languages that the majority of the occupants of the premises speak. For example, after making announcement in English, the FLS Director of a Chinatown hotel may repeat the announcement in Chinese.

There's no single active shooter awareness message that will suffice for all building types, situations, and occupancies. You need to consider the building type and occupancies to prepare the notification scripts. The FDNY recommends the following sample scripts for several occupancies. All the scripts follow the same basic principle: Occupants always need to have a clear understanding that **there is a significant threat and where the threat is (or where the threat was last seen)**.

Sample scripts for active shooter emergency notification in different occupancies:

- For office buildings with trained occupants:
“Attention! Emergency! An active shooter was last seen on the 3rd floor of the building. Avoid danger. Implement the Avoid-Barricade-Confront strategy based on your location.”
- For hotel occupants: (considering there might be foreigner visitors who are not familiar with “active shooter” terminology, we suggest to use “gun shots” instead of “active shooter”.)
“Attention! Emergency! Gun shots are fired on the 3rd floor. Avoid danger. Move to a safe area now. Stay in your room, lock the door and get down.”
- For hospital occupants:
“Attention! Emergency! An active shooter was last seen on the 3rd floor of the building. Implement the Avoid-Barricade-Confront strategy based on your location.”
- For theater/stadium occupants:
“Attention! Emergency! Gun shots fired in theater 5 on the 3rd floor. Avoid danger. Move to a safe area or barricade if possible.”
- For other public assembly (e.g. shopping mall) occupants:
“ Attention! Emergency! Gun shots fired on the 2nd floor on the 6th Ave side. Avoid danger. Move to a safe area or barricade if possible.”

Federal agencies (e.g. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Federal Emergency Management Agency) highly recommend the use of plain language/clear text (not code words) to communicate information effectively. Sending the alert through as many delivery channels as possible is the best way to ensure awareness. The goal is to empower as many individuals as possible with the ability to make an informed decision as to their best option to maximize chances of survival.

Proper notification will allow all building occupants to choose one of the survival techniques (Avoid, Barricade or Confront) based on their own condition, location, and environment.

- Notify/consult with the FLS Brigade regarding the implementation of the emergency action plan.
- Assess the Building Components or Systems and take appropriate actions. Evaluate the building, become familiar with the systems in the building as there are many variables and each building has unique design characteristics.

➤ Stairways and routes of egress

Evaluate the stairway(s) or other routes of egress for use. Some routes of egress or stairways may be denied or limited based on the active shooter(s) location if known. The FLS Director should be prepared to provide details to arriving first responding personnel about the status, availability and the condition of all stairways. It will be useful for the police officers to know which stairways are clear for use.

➤ Elevator operation

In an active shooter incident, the freight elevator may be the best option for the use of police officers. Freight elevators being operated manually, if safe to do so, should be advised to return to the ground level by a two-way communication device/radio with doors closed.

Unlike the required responses in other non-fire emergencies, the FLS Director will not be required to automatically recall all the elevators. Since there are many variables and each building has unique design characteristics, we cannot recommend a universal approach towards passenger's elevator recall.

Upon arrival of the first police officer(s), the FLS Director should explain the elevator function to the arriving police officer(s) and follow their directions.

➤ Interior doors, including fire doors

Manual activation of the fail-safe door release system will facilitate evacuation by unlocking stairway and elevator vestibule doors but keeping them in the closed position. Active shooter

attacks are dynamic events; so, unlike the required responses in other non-fire emergencies, the FLS Director will not be required to automatically activate the fail-safe door release system. The last known location of an active shooter must always be considered prior to the manual activation of the fail-safe door release system.

The operation of the fail safe system may be different from building to building. Buildings built in different years may comply with different applicable Building Codes. The FLS Director must include the status of the stairway (e.g. the fail-safe devices have or have not been activated) and elevator vestibule doors in the information exchange upon NYPD arrival.

➤ Evaluate ventilation system operation

All should be assessed if it is safe to do so.

➤ Evaluate electrical, natural gas, steam and other utility operations

All should be assessed if it is safe to do so.

➤ Evaluate fuel oil storage systems and associated pumps and piping

➤ All should be assessed if it is safe to do so.

• Communications

➤ Continue to monitor the emergency.

➤ Maintain appropriate communication with the FLS Brigade members and building occupants.

➤ Maintain appropriate communication with 911 operators or emergency responders.

➤ If a fire alarm is activated, if safe to do so, the FLS Director should follow standard protocol and procedures of a fire emergency but proceed with extreme caution and keep the NYPD survival techniques (Avoid-Barricade-Confront) in mind.

b. Acceptable actions: NA.

c. Unacceptable actions: NA.

18.3.3 Interacting with Police Officers

During an active shooter emergency, the FDNY normally will not be in the building to direct the required actions. The police officers will respond to the 911 call immediately and go directly to the building.

Police officers will proceed directly to the last known location of the active shooter.

The FLS Director and the FLS brigade members should expect:

- Police officers may wear regular patrol uniforms or external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets, and other tactical equipment.
- Police officers may be armed with rifles and shotguns in addition to their handguns.
- Police officers may shout commands, and may order individuals to the ground for their safety.

As an FLS Director, you are required to notify arriving NYPD, FDNY personnel and other first responders of the nature of the emergency and the actions taken up to the current time. You should also provide building information including:

- 4 sets of floor plans (3 sets for NYPD and 1 set for FDNY).
- 4 sets of Building Information Card (BIC) (3 sets for NYPD and 1 set for FDNY).
- 4 sets of Keys/Access cards (3 sets for NYPD and 1 set for FDNY).
- Fully charged Premises security radios/walkie-talkies.

As an FLS Director, you may need to quickly provide the police officers with the following information, if known:

- Location of the active shooter or his/her last known location.
- Number of shooters, if more than one.
- Physical description of shooter(s).
- Name/identity of the shooter(s) (e.g. employee).
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).
- Number of potential victims at the location.
- The special design of the building (are there open space interior partition materials, etc.)
- Unique tenants (high profile occupants, political officials, armed security, or disabled person, etc.)
- If explosions were heard.

The police officers may request the FLS Director and/or FLS brigade members to operate and control the building systems to assist in isolating the shooter. It is critical for the FLS Director and/or FLS brigade members to follow orders of the police officers.

Remember that the first police officers to arrive on the scene may not stop to help injured persons. Expect teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial responding officers. These teams will treat and remove any injured persons from the areas that have been cleared by the first responding police officers. They may also call upon able-bodied occupants to assist in removing the wounded from the premises.

18.4 Real case discussion

This booklet provides real active shooter cases that occurred in different occupancies. The instructor **must select at least one case from each category** (hotel, public assembly, school, and office) to have an open discussion and classroom exercise with the students. The FDNY recommends that candidates should also study the other cases in this booklet that the instructor did not discuss. **The FDNY provides schools the recommended answers for all discuss questions. Every school should provide these answers to the students after the real case discussion session.**

18.4.1 Hotel cases

(1) Hotel case 1: 2015 Austin Omni hotel shooting



Case summary: A shooter opened fire in the lobby of the Omni hotel, killing a bystander.

Case details: On July 5, 2015, a man was in the lobby area of the Omni hotel, Austin TX, pacing back and forth, carrying a rifle. The man then suddenly shot a random bystander. When officers arrived, he exchanged shots with the responding officers throughout the hotel lobby. The shooter ultimately was shot and killed by a police officer.

Reference resource:

- <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3150396/Gunman-upscale-Austin-hotel-kills-man-5am-random-rifle-attack-shot-dead-police.html>
- <http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20150706-austin-police-id-gunman-victim-at-sundays-hotel-shooting.ece>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a hotel.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the hotel staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location. You are informed that a person is pacing around the lobby of the hotel with a rifle. What action should you take?

3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the hotel occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. You are in a safe location. If the shooter starts to fire shots before police arrive, what action should you take? What is the content of the notification you will make, if it is safe to do so?

5. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

6. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(2) Hotel case 2: 2005 Living Church of God shooting

Case summary: a shooter open fires at the Sheraton Hotel conference room, killing seven people.

Case details: On March 12, 2005, a shooter armed with a handgun, began shooting during a Living Church of God service at the Sheraton Hotel conference room in Brookfield, Wisconsin. Seven people were killed; four were wounded. The shooter committed suicide before police arrived.

Reference resource:

- [A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013](#). U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. September, 2013.

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a hotel.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the hotel staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the shooting is occurring in a conference room on 2nd floor of your hotel. What action should you take?

3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the hotel occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(3) Hotel case 3: 2010 Muna hotel attack



Case summary: A group of three insurgents opened fire at the Muna Hotel in Somalia, killing roughly 30 people and injuring 16 others.

Case details: On August 24, 2010, a group of three insurgents arrived at the gate of Muna hotel in Somalia wearing government military uniforms. The shooters opened fire as soon as the hotel guards opened the way for them.

They then rushed into the hotel corridors, shooting everyone in sight. They targeted bystanders, hotel staff and armed guards. The insurgents moved throughout different floors in the hotel during the attack. Government forces arrived a few minutes later and battled the insurgents room by room, eventually pushing the shooters to the upper floor. According to witnesses, several lawmakers tried to lock themselves in their rooms, but they were hunted down and shot at close range with assault rifles.

The shooters killed at least 30 people, including 4 lawmakers.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/africa/25somalia.html>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a hotel.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the hotel staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the attack began in your hotel. Your staff indicated that there is a group of shooters firing automatic weapons on the ground floor of the hotel. What action should you take?

3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the hotel occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

Note: Circumstances that should be covered:

- Multiple shooters
- Physical description of the shooters (e.g. clothing, weapons, etc.)
- Shooters are trying to open hotel room doors

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

18.4.2 Public assembly cases

(1) Public Assembly case 1: 2012 Colorado movie theater shooting



Case summary: A shooter set off tear gas grenades and shot into the audience of a Colorado movie theater. Twelve people were killed and more than 50 people were wounded.

Case details: On July 20, 2012, a shooter bought a ticket in a Colorado movie theater at a midnight showing of “The Dark Knight Rises”. He sat down in Theater 9 on the ground floor to watch the film. 20 minutes later, he got up and slipped out through the emergency exit, using a plastic tablecloth holder to prop open the door to regain entry.

The shooter then went to his car, parked right by the door, and suited up in tactical gear and a gas mask. He armed himself with three guns - a shotgun, a semi-automatic rifle and a handgun.

About ten minutes later, he went back into the theater where hundreds of people thought his tactical clothing might be a part of the special effects for the film’s premiere.

The shooter tossed a smoke canister before starting to fire shots. He shot at the audience in the theater; however, a bullet penetrated through the wall and hit people in the adjacent theater. As smoke overtook the air, panicking people dropped to the floor and crawled over one another to get out. Witness said the fire alarm system began sounding soon after the attack began. Staff told people in the adjacent theater to evacuate. One witness said she was hesitant to leave because a man yelled that someone was shooting in the lobby.

Police arrived within 90 seconds after the 911 calls. A police officer arrested the shooter behind the movie theater, next to the shooter’s car without resistance.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://abc7.com/archive/8743134/>
- <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444464304577538292604705890>
- <http://www.denverpost.com/2012/07/20/12-shot-dead-58-wounded-in-aurora-movie-theater-during-batman-premier/>
- <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/20/witnesses-to-batman-massacre-describe-terrifying-scene.html>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a multiplex theater.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the theater staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. During theater hours, an employee informs you that an emergency exit of a theater is propped open. What action should you take?

3. Before you take any correction for the emergency exit door, the fire alarm begins to sound, smoke is coming out from a theater and gunshots are heard from the same theater. The crowd starts panicking and self-evacuating. You are in a safe location. What action should you take?

4. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the theater occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

5. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

6. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(2) Public Assembly case 2: 2016 Irving Plaza shooting



Case summary: A shooting incident occurred in the third-floor VIP room during a concert at Irving Plaza, a 1,025-person ballroom-style music venue, in Manhattan, NY. One man was killed and three others were wounded (including the alleged shooter).

Case details: On May 25, 2016, a shooting incident occurred in the third-floor VIP room during a concert. Gun fire spilled into the area near the stage, causing panic among more than 1,000 audience members.

“There were people blocking each other using each other as shields,” said a witness. “I was in the front of the stage ... I was just trying to find an exit to get the hell out.”

There were metal detectors to screen audience members. The performers and the staff including the shooter were allowed to enter the VIP areas where the metal detector may not have been used.

The shooter was injured and exited as people fled the room. He was later arrested by the NYPD.

Reference resource:

- <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/nyregion/people-are-shot-at-irving-plaza-during-ti-concert-police-say.html>
- <http://nypost.com/2016/05/25/three-shot-during-concert-at-irving-plaza/>
- <http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/nypd-close-arrest-deadly-shooting-irving-plaza-article-1.2650743>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of this concert venue.

- 1. What information and knowledge should you share with the venue staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

- 2. Assume you are in a safe location while gun shots were heard. The crowd starts panicking and self-evacuating. What actions should you take?

- 3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the venue occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

- 4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

- 5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(3) Public Assembly case 3: 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack



Case summary: Four shooters attacked Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack resulted in at least 67 deaths (61 civilians and 6 security officers); more than 175 people were wounded in the mass shooting. This attack took almost four days before authorities declared the scene safe.

Case details: On 09/21/2013 at approximately 12:30 pm, four shooters attacked Westgate Shopping Mall, the most upscale shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, using rifles and hand grenades. Shooters stormed into the mall area, shooting people outside the five-story structure and then inside. Two of the shooters entered the mall through the main entrance, the other two making their way up the ramp to the rooftop parking garage. Four shooters shot at all bystanders including adults and children. Shoppers said they also heard grenades exploding.

The victims of this attack included males and females, ranging in age from 8 to 78 years old. The majority of these casualties probably occurred within the first hour of the attack.

During the beginning of the attack, a large number of plainclothes law enforcement and civilian armed personnel were present at the scene and actively assisted in evacuating the victims. Their presence created identification issues for uniformed Kenyan Police first responders.

Poor coordination and lack of effective communication between police and military commanders resulted in the military troops firing on members of the police tactical team, killing one officer and wounding the team commander.

Circumstances in this case:

There were multiple plainclothes law enforcement first responders conducting tactical and rescue operations during the first day of the attack. Very few of the plainclothes law enforcement first responders displayed visible law enforcement identification such as a badge, arm band, ID card or a raid jacket, making identification extremely difficult for other armed first responders.

Reference resource:

1. <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/894158/westgate-report-for-shield-website.pdf>
2. Terror at the Mall (2014). HBO documentary films.
3. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/24/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack-timeline/>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a large mall.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the mall staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the attack began in the mall. Your staff indicated that there were two groups of shooters firing automatic weapons on the ground floor and the rooftop. What actions should you take?

3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

18.4.3 University cases

(1) University case 1: 2007 Virginia Tech shooting (highly recommended case study for the FLS Director working in University or a complex of several commercial buildings.)



Case summary: A Virginia Polytechnic Institute student, opened fire inside a university dormitory and in several classrooms, killing 32 people and wounding 20 others. He committed suicide after the attack.

Case details: On April 16, 2007, a shooter shot and killed two people in a residence hall of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University shortly after 7:00 a.m. He then returned to his own residence hall. While police and emergency medical services units were responding to the shootings in the dorm next door, the shooter changed out of his bloodstained clothes.

About two hours after the initial shooting, the shooter entered another building. He chained the three main entrance doors shut. He placed a note on at least one of the chained doors, claiming that attempts to open the door would cause a bomb to explode. A few students came into contact with the chains on their way in, and, assuming it was construction, crawled in through a ground floor window. Shortly before the shooting began, a faculty member found the bomb threat note and took it to the building's third floor to notify the school's administration. At about the same time the shooter had begun to shoot students and faculty on the second floor. The bomb threat was never reported to the first responders.

At about 9:40 a.m., the shooter began shooting. After hearing shooting in a classroom, many professors and students in other classrooms tried to barricade the classrooms. However, the classrooms were only furnished with lightweight desk-chair combinations and an instructor table. The doors were not lockable from the inside, so the shooter pushed his way in.

In other classrooms, people who braced their bodies against the door were killed because the shooter shot through the classroom doors. However, students in two different classrooms used a different strategy to save their lives: they held the door shut with their feet and hands, keeping their bodies away and staying low. The shooter could not get into the rooms and no one got hurt when he fired through the door.

Hearing the commotion on the floor below, a professor took twenty students from a third-floor classroom into his office where the door could be locked. He then went downstairs to investigate and was shot and killed by the shooter. None of the students locked in the professor's office were harmed.

Approximately ten to twelve minutes after the second attack began, almost immediately after hearing the blast of the police shotgun that took the lock off the door, the shooter killed himself. During this second assault, the shooter had fired at least 174 shots, killing 30 people and wounding 20 people.

Circumstances that should be addressed during the discussion:

1. All-campus notification was not made promptly.

After the first attack, the Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) may have prematurely reported to the responsible safety personnel that the suspect probably was no longer on campus. The responsible safety personnel focused on preventing a panic on campus. They did not alert the entire campus about this dangerous situation.

Shortly before 9:30 a.m., the Virginia Tech community—faculty, staff, and students—were notified by e-mail as follows:

"A shooting incident occurred at West Ambler Johnston earlier this morning. Police are on the scene and are investigating. The university community is urged to be cautious and are asked to contact Virginia Tech Police if you observe anything suspicious or with information on the case. Contact Virginia Tech Police at 231-6411. Stay tuned to the www.vt.edu. We will post as soon as we have more information"

This message did not accurately describe the danger that was still occurring and that the killer had not been apprehended. The message may lead the readers to assume that the shooting may be an accident and the shooter is not a threat since police are already on the scene.

If the warning was made earlier and clearer, there may have been more people on guard. It could have resulted in quicker recognition of a problem or suspicious activity, quicker reporting to the police, and quicker response of the police.

2. The staff and students did not receive proper training:

(1) The chained doors were not reported.

The students who noticed the chained doors should have reported it to the responsible school safety personnel. Considering the incident happened in the dormitory, the responsible school safety personnel should report to the police promptly.

(2) Bomb threat was not taken seriously.

The faculty member, who noticed the bomb threat, should have immediately called 911 when the bomb threat was found.

(3) The actions taken during shootings may not be effective.

The students, faculty and staff should be provided with proper training regarding A-B-C tactics. They should know that if they have a way out, they should try to avoid as soon as possible. Some students escaped by jumping from windows. All who jumped survived, some with broken bones, some uninjured except for scratches or bruises. Some survivors did the optimum window escape, lowering themselves from the window sill to drop to the ground, reducing the fall by their body length.

People should not brace whole body against the door. If the only means available to barricade the door is with your body, attempt to stay lower than average waist level to avoid any shot fired through the door by the shooter.

The professor who brought his students into his office should have stayed in a safe place instead of approaching the scene.

Reference resource:

- Virginia Tech Review Panel, “Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel,” <https://governor.virginia.gov/media/3772/fullreport.pdf>
- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://www.changemag.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/January-February%202008/full-connecting-the-dots.html>
- <https://www.policeone.com/school-violence/articles/1473536-Lessons-learned-at-Virginia-Tech-shooting/>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a university containing multi-buildings on campus.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the university students, professors and staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the first attack began and the attack was in Dormitory ABC. You are informed that there was a shooting in a dormitory and two dead bodies were found. No one is sure who and where the shooter(s) is/are. What actions should you take? What is the content of the notification you will make?

3. You are informed that there is a bomb threat in Building X. What actions should you take?

4. Assume you are in a safe location while the second shooting began on the 2nd floor of Building K. What actions should you take? What is the content of the notification you will make?

5. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

6. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(2) University case 2: 2008 Northern Illinois University shooting



Case summary: A former graduate student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire in a university lecture hall, killing five people. The shooter committed suicide before police arrived.

Case details: On 2/14/2008, at approximately at 3:05 p.m., a shooter carried his weapons onto the campus in a guitar case and entered a large auditorium-style lecture hall on the campus of Northern Illinois University where a class was in session. The shooter shot at the instructor and then at students sitting in the front row. After firing nearly 60 shots, the shooter then returned to the stage and committed suicide.

Officers responded to gunfire in the hall at approximately at 3:06 p.m. The officers immediately placed campus on lockdown. A campus alert went out at 3:20 p.m.: “There has been a report of a possible gunman on campus. Get to a safe area and take precautions until given the all clear. Avoid the King Commons and all buildings in that vicinity.”

In the *report of the February 14, 2008 shootings at Northern Illinois University*, it addressed the importance of alternative communication system in addition to landline telephones and cell phones. Traditional communication systems become overloaded almost immediately. An alternative system, like hand-held radios, will allow for continued communication with the FLS brigades and with other key school staff. The report also suggested using social network sites, such as Facebook and twitter to reach out to the students.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- *Report of the February 14, 2008 shootings at Northern Illinois University*
<http://www.niu.edu/feb14report/feb14report.pdf>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a university containing multi-buildings on campus.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the university students, professors and staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the attack began. You are informed that there was a shooting in a lecture hall. What action should you take?

3. Assume the attack happened in a Lecture Hall Y. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the campus occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(3) University case 3: 2012 Oikos University shooting (single-building campus)



Case summary: A shooter opened fire at Oikos University in Oakland, California, killing seven students and wounding three others. The shooter later surrendered at a supermarket in nearby Alameda city.

Case description: On 04/02/2012, around 10:30 a.m., a group of nursing students were taking a test at Oikos University in Oakland, California when a rear door swung open and a former student entered- one arm clamped around the school's receptionist, the other clutching a pistol.

"Everybody to the front of the class," ordered the shooter. He ordered classmates to line up against the wall. "Get in line! I'm going to kill you all!" said the shooter before opening fire. Then the shooter fired his handgun, fatally wounding the school receptionist. The shooting set off panic, with students fleeing in all directions. The shooter kept firing, killing 7 people and injuring 3.

When the first gunshot rang, students in the next classroom did not immediately sense danger. They thought it was a firecracker. Then a rapid burst followed "pow, pow, pow, pow". The students finally recognized the sounds as gunshots. A student sat next to the classroom door jumped up and locked it. A student dialed 911. Some students hid under their desks. Others pressed into the far corners of the dark room.

One student texted his mother: "There's a shooting here call 911." Seconds later, his phone rang in the silent room. It was his mother calling back. "I pressed it to vibrate as fast as I could," the student said. After students heard more gunfire, the shooter wiggled the locked classroom's door handle, kicked at the door. Three or four shots blasted through the door, shattering the window. The shooter then left without entering the locked classroom.

The first 911 calls had come in at 10:33 a.m. just moments after the first shots were fired. Police arrived three minutes later. The shooter left the school before police arrived. Hours later, the shooter surrendered to authorities at a supermarket about five miles away from the scene of the shooting.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012.
- <http://abc7news.com/archive/8604893/>
- <http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/9-lessons-learned-from-the-oikos-college-shooting>
- <http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/04/03/oikos-university-student-locked-door-saved-our-lives/>
- <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-school-shootings-remembering-Oikos-3466879.php>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of a single-building university.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the university students, professors and staff during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the attack began. You are informed that there was shooting in a classroom A. What action should you take?

3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the building occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

18.4.4 Office building cases

(1) Office buildings case 1: 2008 Silicon Valley office shooting

Case summary: On November 14, 2008, a shooter opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people, including the CEO. The shooter was later arrested by the police.

Case details: The workplace is a suite inside an office building in an office park in Santa Clara, California. The shooter had been fired hours prior to the attack and returned to the office to request a meeting with company officials. He shot and killed all three victims during the meeting and fled the area in an SUV. When police responded to the scene, the police were not sure if the shooter was still in the office park or not. The next morning, police arrested him on a public road.

Note for office building shooting incidents:

It is very typical for active shooter cases to occur in office buildings. This type of workplace violence involves a violent act by a current or former employee who has a dispute with one of the employees. The FLS Director and security manager should be notified in advance of terminations and other situations that have a potential for aggressive behavior. Awareness and cooperation of public safety, management, supervisors and all other employees is critical to reduce the threat of violence.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/triple-murder-stuns-silicon-valley-firm/>

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of an office building.

1. What information and knowledge should you share with the building occupants during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are in a safe location while the attack began. You are informed that there was a shooting in a meeting room. What action should you take?

3. Assume the suite is room 401 on 4th floor in your building. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the building occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

(2) Office buildings case 2: 1999 Atlanta office shooting

Case summary: A shooter opened fire at two brokerage offices, including one where he was formerly employed, killing nine people and wounding 12 others. Prior to the attack, the shooter killed his wife and two children at their home with a hammer. Reports state that he had lost more than \$400,000 on his investments shortly before the attacks.

Case details: On 07/29/1999, the shooter went to the offices of his former employer, Momentum Securities. Witnesses say that the shooter briefly chatted with coworkers before suddenly pulling out two pistols and opening fire. He shot and killed four people.

An employee, who was in Momentum Securities when the shooting broke out, said he also called 911, but was put on hold the first time and had to call again. He and another friend had tipped over a desk and barricaded themselves in a back office when shots rang out. The shooter tried to force the door open and then fired two shots through the door, one of which missed the friend by 3 inches. After calling police, they threw a computer terminal through the third-floor office window to create a potential escape route that police later used as a way to get into the building.

The shooter then walked to the nearby All-Tech Investment Group building and murdered five more people. The shooter then left the scene before police could arrive.

The shooter killed himself as he was being pulled over by police, about 6 hours after the shooting spree began.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/29/atlanta.shooting.04/>
- <http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/30/atlanta.shooting.08/>

Discussion and exercise:

1. Assume you are an FLS Director of an office building. What information and knowledge should you share with the building occupants during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

2. Assume you are an FLS Director of the first office building and you are informed that there is a shooting on third floor. What action should you take?

3. Assume you are an FLS Director of the first office building; you are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the office occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

4. Assume you are an FLS Director of the first office building, what information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

5. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

6. Assume you are an FLS Director of another office building and you are informed that there is a shooting in a nearby Building B. What action should you take? What is the content of the notification you will make?

(3) Office buildings case 3: 2010 Las Vegas courthouse shooting

Case Summary: A shooter opened fire in the lobby of a federal courthouse, killing a security officer and wounding a deputy United States Marshal. He was fatally shot by police.

Case details: On 01/04/2010, a shooter pulled a shotgun from underneath his coat and started firing indiscriminately from outside the security areas where visitors pass through metal detectors and x-ray machines. There are offices for senators and judges in the same office building.

The shooter was fatally shot by police while running away. Reports state that the shooter was disgruntled over a reduction of his Social Security benefits.

For several hours after the shooting, local television stations broadcasted what turned out to be false reports of other shooters on the loose, which led to evacuations in the commercial area surrounding the courthouse.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05vegas.html?_r=0

Discussion and exercise:

Assume you are an FLS Director of an office building.

- 1. What information and knowledge should you share with the building occupants during your periodic active shooter emergency preparedness training?

- 2. Assume you are in a safe location while the shooting begins in the lobby and the Fire Command Center is not compromised. What action should you take?

- 3. You are in a safe location and are capable of making a notification to all the building occupants. What is the content of the notification you will make?

- 4. If you are aware of anyone who holds a firearm carry license, what should you do?

- 5. What information should you provide to the arriving police officers?

- 6. Assume you are an FLS Director of another commercial building surrounding the courthouse. You hear the local news stating that the shooter may be on the loose. What action should you take? What is the content of the notification you will make?

18.4.5 Cases where civilians helped to stop shootings or prevent further injuries

This booklet provides real active shooter cases where civilians took actions to stop shootings or to prevent further injuries. The instructor **must go through all of these cases** to have an open discussion with the students.

(1) Case 1: 2011 Tucson shooting (supermarket parking lot)

Case summary: A shooter opened fire into a crowd of people outside a Safeway supermarket where Representative Gabrielle Giffords was holding a constituent meeting, killing six people and wounding 13 others.

Case details: On 01/08/2011, a shooter opened fire into a crowd of people outside a Safeway supermarket where an elected official (Gabrielle Giffords) was holding a constituent meeting. After shooting her, the shooter proceeded to fire apparently randomly at other members of the crowd. When the shooter stopped to reload, he dropped the loaded magazine from his pocket to the sidewalk. A bystander, Patricia Maisch, 61, wrestled the magazine away. Several men then pounced on the shooter and threw the shooter to the ground. Another bystander clubbed the back of the shooter's head with a folding chair. These actions stopped the shooting. Police arrived on the scene at 4 minutes after the first 911 call.

Reference resource:

- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/patricia-maisch-describes-stopping-gunman-reloading/story?id=12577933>

Discussion and exercise:

What part of ABC tactics does this case emphasize?

(2) Case 2: 2016 UCLA shooting

Case summary: A shooter opened fire in a murder-suicide at UCLA. Two men (including the shooter) were killed.

Case details: On 06/01/2016, a shooting occurred at a fourth-floor office in an academic building of UCLA.

Immediately after the shooting, a professor held the victim's office door shut after hearing two gunshots come from the office. The professor also told everybody to stay inside and lock the door. The professor was credited for potentially saving lives during the shooting.

NOTE: FDNY does not recommend that civilians hold doors by hand or block doors with bodies. People should find furniture or tools to stop doors from opening.

A campus-wide alert to avoid the area was issued via UCLA's Bruin Alert system immediately. The Bruin Alert is UCLA's campus wide emergency mass notification system. It works on a self-subscription basis for receiving text messages, and all students with a valid email address are automatically enrolled in the email updates. The alert stated, "Shooting at Engineering 4. Go to secure location and deny entry (lockdown) now!" Los Angeles Police Department officers arrived at the building about 4 minutes after the alert was sent. The campus-wide alert urged everyone to find shelter and lock the door until police could secure the campus.

CNN reports some emergency responses that UCLA staff and students took:

About 120 other students were in an auditorium classroom on the UCLA campus when cellphones started buzzing with news of the emergency.

Students raced to close the doors to the large room. They were stuck open, unable to be closed without an Allen wrench. They ran down a hallway to a file storage room where they could lock the door. For extra safety, they pushed a table in front of the door.

Another group of students were in one of those rooms where the door opened out so once they understood the gravity of the situation they began searching on the internet for "How to lock a swinging door."

Someone suggested tying a projector cord to the door handle. Then they tied that to a chair that was bolted to the floor.

Ninety minutes later the students received the all clear message.


Another student said that initially her class was in a room where the door couldn't be locked, so the professor and the teaching assistant led them to a place more secure.

Even with the door locked, they decided to make it more secure. A student donated her belt as did another student, and a man in their class bound the hinge so it wouldn't open.

Example of using belt to stop a door from opening



ABC news also cited UCLA students' twitter posts to show how they barricaded themselves when they were unable to lock classroom doors:



Two handguns and a suicide note were later found near the two bodies. Shortly after the shooting, police sources told the Los Angeles Times that from the appearance of the bodies, a student may have killed a professor. At least three shots were fired in the shooting.

Reference resource:

- <http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/02/us/ucla-active-shooter-preparation/>
- <http://abcnews.go.com/US/classroom-doors-lock-add-ucla-shooting-scare/story?id=39555158>
- <http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-ln-ucla-shooting-account-klug-sarkar-20160603-snap-story.html>

Discussion and exercise:

What part of ABC tactics does this case emphasize?

18.4.6 Reference materials

- [Active Shooter](#). *NYPD Shield*. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- [Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation](#). *The New York City Police Department*. 2012. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- [Active Shooter: How to Response](#). *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- [Incorporating Active Shooter Incident Planning Into Health Care Facility Emergency Operations Plans](#). *U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*. 2014. Accessed 3/11/2015.
- [A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013](#). *U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation*. September, 2013. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- Garris, L. G. [Preparing for the Worst: How to Plan for an Active Shooter Scenario](#). *The BOMA Magazine*. Accessed 2/17/2015.
- [Active Shooter Preparedness](#). *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. Accessed 3/4/2015.
- *U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education*. [The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting \(2016 Edition\)](#). Washington, D.C., 2016.

Chapter 19. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

According to a study published in *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, residents of high-rise buildings had greater survival rates from cardiac arrests on the lower floors (3rd floor or below). Of Patients who had cardiac arrests in private residences and were treated by 911 first responders, 4.2% of the people living at or below the 3rd floor survived to be discharged from hospital but only 2.6% of the people living above the 3rd floor survived. In an analysis by floor, survival was 0.9% above floor 16 (i.e., below the 1% threshold for futility), and there were no survivors above the 25th floor.


Another study published in *Academic Emergency Medicine (AEM) Journal* analyzing FDNY EMS paramedic units response time (from arrival on-scene to the patient), indicates that for office, apartment, or other buildings ten stories or higher, the on-scene to patient median time interval was 3.2 minutes compared with 2.3 minutes for buildings three to ten stories in height. In this study, 53.2% of cases were provided with one or more escorts. The assistance included opening a locked outer building door, securing an elevator and directing or escorting the EMS personnel to the patient. Delays in reaching the patient trended to reduction by the presence of an escort on-scene.

Researchers outline several solutions to improve time to patient contact, such as giving 911-initiated first responders sole access to elevators for emergency service without public interference, similar to the access of firefighters during a fire; emergency alerts to building staff before arrival of the first responders; and better placement of defibrillators to increase bystander use.

19.1 Medical emergency preparedness

2014 Fire Code requires all Comprehensive Fire Safety and Emergency Action Plans to address the coordination of the emergency response to a medical emergency at the premises. The Comprehensive Fire Safety and Emergency Action Plan must provide the procedures for coordinating with firefighting, emergency medical service and other emergency response personnel. The plan also should identify any persons on the premises who are qualified and willing to provide cardio-pulmonary resuscitation or other emergency medical care to building occupants upon notification by the FLS Director. However, a building owner is not required to establish or train an emergency medical response team, but only to invite CPR-trained or other qualified persons working at the premises to volunteer to be contacted in the event of a medical emergency on the premises, and to establish a procedure by which they can be notified (such as a text or call). The volunteer's unavailability, untimely response, or unwillingness to respond to a notification of a medical emergency does not constitute a breach of the owner's or the emergency preparedness staff's obligations under this rule.

FLS Directors are neither expected nor required to personally provide patient care, as their duties as FLS Director require them to remain at the Fire Command Center during an emergency. But the FLS Director and other FLS staff must be familiar with the medical emergency procedures listed in the building Comprehensive Fire Safety and Emergency Action Plan. All FLS staff must also be familiar with the location(s) of defibrillators or other medical equipment for medical emergencies.



AED (Automatic External Defibrillator)

The building occupants must be trained or informed that they must call 911 in case of any medical emergency. In addition, they must be trained or informed that after calling 911, they have to also notify FLS Director or other designated FLS staff of medical emergencies on the premises. The emergency contact information (including how to reach 911 and the designated FLS staff phone number, etc.) should be provided to every building occupant.

Reference material:

- Ian R. Drennan, Ryan P. Strum, Adam Byers, Jason E. Buick, Steve Lin, Sheldon Cheskes, Samantha Hu, Laurie J. Morrison, for the Rescue Investigators. **Out-of-hospital cardiac arrest in high-rise buildings: delays to patient care and effect on survival.** CMAJ, January 2016
<http://www.cmaj.ca/content/188/6/413>

- Cardiac arrests in high-rise buildings: Low survival rates above 3rd floor
<https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/01/160118134426.htm>
- Living above the third-floor drastically reduces your chances of surviving cardiac arrest, study suggests
<http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/highrise-heart-attacks>
- Silverman RA1, Galea S, Blaney S, Freese J, Prezant DJ, Park R, Pahk R, Caron D, Yoon S, Epstein J, Richmond NJ. **The “Vertical Response Time”: Barriers to Ambulance Response in an Urban Area.** *Acad Emerg Med.* 2007, Sep;14(9):772-8.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1553-2712.2007.tb02350.x/pdf>

19.2 Medical emergency response

In the event of a medical emergency in the building, the FLS Director must report to the Fire Command Center or designated alternative location.

The FLS Director or other designated FLS staff must call 911 to ensure that the medical emergency has been reported to the NYC 911 system. The caller is required to provide the following information to the 911 operator:

- i. The address of the appropriate building entrance or other location at which emergency responders will be met by FLS Director or other designated FLS staff
- ii. Caller’s name and telephone number for a return call
- iii. The number and the location of victim/patient
- iv. The general description of the victim/patient’s complaint or present condition (e.g. bleeding, breathing erratically, conscious/unconscious, etc.)
- v. Any hazards involved

The caller must follow the exact instructions of the 911 operator.

After calling 911, the FLS Director must designate an FLS staff to meet emergency responders; the designated FLS staff must guide the emergency responders to the exact location of the victim/patient. The

FLS Director also must designate FLS staff to respond to victim/patient location to control the access to the scene, to investigate and report to the FLS Director.

FLS staff should make a notification to CPR-trained volunteers listed in the plan and request to provide assistance (when appropriate). Only trained employees should provide first aid assistance. If there are no trained employees on the premises, designate a responsible person to stay with the victim/patient. The victim/patient should not be moved by untrained personnel, unless the victim/patient's location is unsafe.

If the victim/patient is not on street level, FLS Director should decide which elevator(s) can fit the stretcher and provide easy access to the victim/patient. The elevator(s) should be recalled and be switched to the independent/manual mode (not the Phase II) prior to arrival of emergency responders. The recalled elevator(s) must be held for emergency responder use only.

The FDNY recommends that the FLS Director to make an announcement to the building occupants for the recall of elevator. Sample script of the announcement:

“Attention! Elevator bank A is currently not available due to medical emergency.”

19.3 Medical emergency scenario

FLS Director training schools must discuss the following scenario with the FLS Director students.

Day and Time: Friday, at 8:00 PM

Location: rooftop restaurant in your building

Weather: Extreme heat, 90 degrees Fahrenheit with high humidity

Scenario:

An outdoor birthday party started at 6:30 PM on the rooftop of a restaurant. The birthday party attendees have been drinking alcohol since their arrival, and the humidity on the outdoor patio is extremely high.

A member of the birthday party, a middle aged woman, has collapsed to the ground and appears to be unconscious and unresponsive. Another member of the party yells for help and begins telling those around that the woman has a heart condition.

A building staff member observed the entire incident and informs you of all the details.

Assume you are the current FLS Director on duty, what actions should you take?

Recommend actions:

- Call 911 and provide the following information:
 - A woman fell and appears to be unconscious and unresponsive.
 - The address of the appropriate building entrance that the designated FLS staff will meet the emergency responders.
 - The woman is in the building rooftop restaurant.
 - Your contact information.
 - The woman may have a heart condition and she has been consuming alcohol.
- Follow the exact instructions of the 911 operator.
- Report to the Fire Command Center.
- Notify CPR-trained volunteers listed in the plan and request to provide assistance.
- Designate FLS staff to control access to the patient location, prevent any unnecessary people from joining the scene.
- Designate FLS staff to meet the ambulance and other emergency responders at the entrance mentioned in the 911 call.
- Recall an elevator to street level and hold the elevator for emergency responder use only. Make announcement to the occupants: *“Attention! Elevator bank A is currently not available due to medical emergency.”*